Dear Deeply Readers,

Welcome to the archives of Syria Deeply. While we paused regular publication of the site on May 15, 2018, and transitioned some of our coverage to Peacebuilding Deeply, we are happy to serve as an ongoing public resource on the Syrian conflict. We hope you’ll enjoy the reporting and analysis that was produced by our dedicated community of editors contributors.

We continue to produce events and special projects while we explore where the on-site journalism goes next. If you’d like to reach us with feedback or ideas for collaboration you can do so at partners@newsdeeply.com.

Syrian Rebels Are Pushing Back Against Their Patrons

Recent rebel mergers and fragmentation are a sign that increased strategic differences between Syrian rebels and regional powers are pushing them apart, writes Syrian expert Haid Haid.

Written by Haid Haid Published on Read time Approx. 3 minutes
A Turkish-backed Syrian rebel fires off his gun in the northwestern border town of al-Bab on February 23, 2017, after they fully captured the town from ISIS.AFP/Nazeer al-Khatib

There is a general perception that rebel backers have total control over their Syrian allies. Rebel groups are even viewed as mere proxies. This led, among other reasons, to direct negotiations, on multiple occasions, between the relevant regional and international players without the presence of any Syrians.

Nonetheless, the recent merger of rebel groups with Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, the rebranded former al-Qaida affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra, in northern Syria and the ongoing anti-regime offensive in Daraa happened against the will of their regional patrons, namely Turkey and Jordan. These developments indicate the limits of regional sponsors’ influence.

The fragmentation among local actors and their total dependence on outside support had, until recently, given their backers the upper hand. The rebel patrons largely shaped their military strategies, their priorities and even relations between rebel groups. They also influenced the insurgents’ participation in the political negotiations as well as selecting their negotiating teams. Because they shared the same strategic goal of overthrowing Assad, rebel groups were willing to put up with this state of affairs.

The Russian military intervention in Syria in September 2015 has dramatically transformed the Syrian conflict and its dynamics. It also shaped the approaches and the priorities of rebels’ donors. Jordan was among the first regional actors to reach with Russia, in late 2015, a “gentleman’s agreement” to alleviate violence and destruction in southern Syria. Amman, in return, has been pushing for the de-escalation of the fight against the Assad regime. The new strategy aims to prioritize fighting radical groups along the Jordanian border to stabilize the area and control the flow of Syrian refugees.

Turkey also has restored its relations with Russia in the second half of 2016 to secure its border from both ISIS and the Syrian Kurds. The fall of Aleppo in December 2016 was widely perceived to have been coordinated with Turkey in exchange for a safe passage for its military-led operation in Syria. Some rebel groups were also pressured to prioritize fighting against ISIS alongside the Turkish offensive over fighting Assad.

These policy shifts made it clear to rebels, or at least to some of them, that the Syrian conflict has become a chess game against everyone. Those insurgents, as a result, started thinking about how to protect their interests from their allies.

The increased threats facing rebels in the south pushed them to defy their patron Jordan and launch an offensive against the regime in Daraa on February 12. Syrian journalist Ahmed al-Hourani explains that the high stakes involved pushed many rebels, across the ideological spectrum, to work together to secure their positions. He also hints that what happened in Aleppo might be duplicated in the south. In other words, Jordan might allow the Syrian regime to restore its control over Daraa’s strategic rebel-held border crossing. Such a move would allow the regime to split rebel-controlled territories and potentially besiege them.

The large-scale merger between Free Syrian Army groups (FSA) and hardliners, such as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, in the newly formed alliance known as Hayʼat Taḥrir al-Sham (Levant Liberation Committee) was also done against the will of rebels’ sponsors. This merger is considered by all measures a big mistake, as it will make the groups involved a target for anti-radical campaigns, including by ISIS, and will terminate or reduce the outside assistance channeled to them. Yet it happened, as a means to protect the interests of the groups involved.

Both incidents could, therefore, be seen as the rebels’ last shot to establish new facts on the ground and block any deal behind their backs. If an international peace agreement tries to bypass them, they are prepared to play a deadly spoiler.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Syria Deeply.

This article was originally published by Chatham House and is reprinted here with permission.

Never miss an update. Sign up here for our Syria Deeply newsletter to receive weekly updates, special reports and featured insights on one of the most critical issues of our time.

Suggest your story or issue.

Send

Share Your Story.

Have a story idea? Interested in adding your voice to our growing community?

Learn more