Much has been said about Russia’s intensified military involvement in Syria and its call for building an international coalition to confront the Islamic State (ISIS). As usual, opinions have varied. Some have viewed this as an opportunity to seek a solution to Syria’s intractable conflict; others have voiced alarms about Russia’s actions and motivations and cautioned against cooperation. And, as usual, the reasons and context for both positions and those in between are complicated, nuanced and ever changing.
The Carnegie Corporation of New York asked a number of leading Russia experts to weigh in on this urgent debate. Do Russia and the United States have a shared objective concerning Syria? If so, how can they settle the most divisive element in their current positions – the future of Syria’s president, Bashar al-Assad? And is it possible for the United States and Russia to cooperate in ending conflict in Syria and defeating ISIS and, if yes, what are the necessary steps toward it?
–Deana Arsenian, Vice President, International Program and Program Director, Russia and Eurasia, Carnegie Corporation of New York
Professor of Political Science, City College of New York/City University of New York and Senior Research Scholar, Columbia University
What’s truly surprising about the Kremlin’s latest military moves in Syria is that anyone who has paid the slightest attention to Soviet and Russian policy in the Middle East should find them the least bit surprising. Moscow has a long history with Syria, based on multiple modes of cooperation that preceded Bashar al-Assad, and even his wily, pitiless and long-reigning father, Hafez (prime minister 1970–71, president 1971–2000).
The Damascus-Moscow alignment has endured for various reasons. During the Cold War, the Kremlin regarded Syria’s Ba’ath Party, whose ideology is a mélange of pan-Arab nationalism and socialism, as a “progressive force.” This assessment was reinforced by the Syrian government’s refusal to participate in Washington’s Containment strategy. Furthermore, Syria is geopolitically significant. When the civil war began in 2011, its population was 23 million, making it the eighth most populous Arab country. It has a long Mediterranean coast and good ports. Its military has relied almost completely on Soviet and Russian armaments, the cumulative tally of its purchases totaling billions of dollars. Its leaders have been willing to provide Russia (and the USSR before it) access to naval bases and airfields.
As a result, Moscow has what economists call substantial “sunk costs” in Syria: interests acquired, political contacts cultivated, markets (for arms and trade) nurtured and access to strategic installations – above all the naval facility at Tartus – gained.
Read Why Russia’s Actions in Syria Are No Shocker by Rajan Menon in The National Interest
Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Center on the United States and Europe, and Director of Brookings’ Arms Control Initiative
The United States and Russia have a common interest in defeating ISIS and promoting an end to the conflict and chaos in Syria, and the U.S. and Russian militaries have a specific interest in cooperating to de-conflict their respective military operations in and over Syria. But finding a path to broader cooperation will prove a challenge.
Washington and Moscow hold very different views regarding the future of Bashar al-Assad. The United States sees no place for Assad, given the violence he has committed against his own people. Russia is not ready to simply throw him under the bus. That difference poses an obstacle to broader cooperation. A second question concerns the conduct of military operations. The U.S. military is targeting ISIS, but Russian forces may well target a wider spectrum of opposition groups. Coming to terms on which groups they are fighting could pose a second obstacle.
Even if broad cooperation proves elusive, it makes sense for Washington and Moscow to stay in touch on Syria and ISIS, and try to manage their differences. The bilateral agenda does not need another big problem issue at the moment.
Follow Steven Pifer on Twitter: @steven_pifer
Senior Fellow, Carnegie Council for Ethics and International Affairs
What is evident is that while the United States and Russia disagree over one “elephant in the room” aspect of resolving the Syrian crisis – the fate of President Bashar al-Assad – they share an equally obvious, self-interested resolve to de-fang and defeat the ISIL forces that now control large swathes of eastern Syria. In this regard, it is, to say the least, frustrating to look on as two world leaders snipe at each other over how this is to be accomplished. It is rather like two Neros fiddling while Rome, or in this case Damascus, burns.
Read Messrs. Obama and Putin: Put Syria and Syrians First at the Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs
Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Russia & Eurasia Program Center for Strategic and International Studies
If Atlanticists were back in charge of Russia’s foreign policy, or if U.S. decision-makers were possessed by the spirits of Talleyrand and Metternich, movement in one direction or another might be possible. But at present, unless ISIS becomes such a threat that Assad is seen as a lesser evil, or Russia’s ability to sustain its policy in the region is compromised, there will be little basis for common action.
Given Russia’s military deployments to Syria and efforts to establish a new coalition, the United States has little choice but to engage. Washington’s current strategy of conducting airstrikes and supporting moderate rebel groups has utterly failed to stem the advancing tide of the Islamic State or bring peace to Syria. This failure has damaged Washington’s credibility in the region, creating an opening for Russia and others to insert themselves into the conflict. Whether Washington likes it or not, Russia is an increasingly important player in Syria, and any political solution will have to take account of its equities.
Russia of course has its own agenda, which largely centers on maintaining Syria as a strategic partner, keeping its naval base on the Mediterranean coast at Tartus, checking the continued advance of extremist forces and using its intervention to establish Russia as a regional power broker. Both publicly and privately Russian officials have said they do not see the maintenance of Bashar al-Assad’s rule as a core interest. Moscow cares more about preserving the Syrian state structure – which it argues the U.S. failed to do in Iraq and Libya – along with Russian influence in Damascus. It also seeks to take Western (and domestic) attention off the conflict in Ukraine, which threatens to become more and more of an albatross for the Kremlin. The U.S. should have no illusions about Russia’s intentions, but with Russian forces present in Syria, Moscow has already established that is going to be part of the conflict’s next phase. Washington has little choice but to accommodate itself to that reality, and should explore whether a basis exists for cooperation that could improve the chances for a political solution to the Syrian conflict.
Professor, National Security Affairs, U.S. Naval War College
U.S.-Russia cooperation on Syria can only occur when both countries share a similar assessment of the threat and its causes and come to an agreement about how best to remedy the situation. The fact that the United States, Europe and Russia are all menaced by the rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is, in itself, not a sufficient basis for joint action. As long as Washington maintains that the regime of Bashar al-Assad is the cause of the Syrian crisis, and that its removal from power is the only way to move to a solution – while Moscow insists the exact opposite – there is no basis for anything other than limited, short-term tactical cooperation. The dialogue initiated between Defense Secretary Ashton Carter and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu, and the direct meeting between Presidents Barack Obama and Vladimir Putin show no signs of narrowing these gaps.
Unlike in the aftermath of 9/11, both sides, at present, see the price of cooperation as higher than the projected rewards. Moscow sees nothing on offer from the United States that would cause the Kremlin to abandon its support of its partner in Damascus (or scale back its efforts in Ukraine) in order to help the United States salvage its Middle East policy by facilitating Assad’s departure. In Washington, there is little enthusiasm for forging a partnership on Syria if it means conceding a de facto sphere of Russian and Iranian influence in the region and accepting a continuing role for Assad in determining Syria’s future given that U.S. policy remains committed to his complete departure from power.
Read Moscow’s War in the Air: Russia Sends a Message in Syria in The National Interest
Executive Director, Center for the National Interest
Russian President Vladimir Putin has demonstrated through action that it will be quite difficult if not impossible to find a political settlement to the Syrian civil war without some form of U.S.-Russia cooperation. Indeed, Moscow may be positioning its new bases to allow for ongoing support to the Syrian government even if Damascus should fall. At the same time, facts on the ground have demonstrated that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has much more support, and is much more resilient, than most Western observers apparently expected.
This presents the Obama administration with a clear choice: continue to support relatively weak opposition forces fighting both Assad and the Islamic State, with support from key regional allies but at cross-purposes with Russia and Iran (which are supporting Assad against the Islamic State and others), or work together with Moscow to try to build a unified coalition to fight the Islamic State and give less priority to ousting Assad. In practical terms, this means moving away from previous U.S. insistence that Assad’s departure should be a precondition for any negotiations toward a political settlement. The current policy approach has not yet succeeded after four years and few expect dramatic changes in the foreseeable future. The alternative would force the administration to confront significant political opposition inside the United States and likely from some U.S. allies. And it would not be easy to find a common approach with Moscow.
That said, successful U.S.-Russia cooperation could substantially alter the dynamics of the fight against the Islamic State and, hopefully, accelerate its defeat. This cooperation could include some form of coordination of international air strikes with ground operations as well as joint U.S.-Russia efforts to persuade other regional states to participate in the fight and to facilitate talks between the Syrian government and non-Islamic State opposition forces.
Read “The Politics Behind Russia’s Support for Syria” by Paul Saunders at the Tokyo Foundation
Follow Paul Saunders on Twitter @1796farewell
Professor of Political Science at UCLA and Director of the Russia Political Insight project
The U.S. and Russia share an interest in limiting and ultimately defeating ISIS. They also share an interest in a return to stability in Syria, but they differ fundamentally on what that stability would look like. However, Russia’s interests in Syria and even with regard to ISIS are not the most salient objectives for Putin at the moment. The central goal of Russian actions – both military and diplomatic – is to reduce Russia’s international isolation and achieve victories on the international stage that can be used domestically for propaganda purposes. The almost seamless segue from the conflict in Ukraine to the conflict in Syria observed in both the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russian media was revealing.
In such circumstances, the U.S. should be ready to explore any possibilities for coordination (cooperation is probably too much to expect) with Russia on ISIS and Syria – but at an appropriate level. Conversations should continue between Foreign Minister Lavrov and Secretary Kerry and between the military leadership of the two countries. Meetings between presidents should only occur when significant agreements have already been negotiated at a lower level and should be arranged in such a way as to minimize the potential for Russian media to exploit these for propaganda purposes. Any attempt to “change the subject” from Ukraine should be resisted. And the policy of economic sanctions, which has over time been bearing fruit, needs to be sustained.
Follow Daniel Treisman on Twitter @dtreisman
Professor of Political Science and International Affairs, Elliott School of International Affairs
The current leadership of both the U.S. and Russia agree on the need to combat ISIL. This provides grounds for cooperation. Complicating cooperation are: (a) that the leaderships disagree on what an acceptable alternative to ISIL is and (b) whether cooperation itself is undesirable because it could bolster Putin’s international and domestic standing less than two years after Russia grossly violated the European security order by annexing Crimea. For Russia, therefore, the question is whether defeating ISIL is worth giving up Assad. For the U.S., the key question is whether Russian support would make the decisive difference in defeating ISIL. If not, then why risk throwing Putin a political lifeline and ending its punishment of Russia over Crimea? Not to mention effectively acquiescing to Assad, which could mean either new massacres of the opposition or continued civil war. It seems to me that Russia could be decisive for the anti-ISIL coalition only if its leadership is willing essentially to give up Assad, forcing him to come to the table for a compromise with the non-ISIL opposition to pose a united front against ISIL. But this is possible only if the non-ISIL opposition can be forced to agree to something other than the complete ouster of people Assad represents, and it is far from clear that the U.S. can credibly deliver that, in which case support from other countries will be crucial as well. In short, what is needed is a grand diplomatic bargain that is unlikely to happen but that policymakers should strive for with energy and creativity. While Putin now appears to think defeating ISIL is not worth giving up on Assad, his public does not support a Syrian military adventure, giving him at least some incentive to consider a compromise in addition to other realities of Syrian politics. From the American perspective, including Putin in such a bargain would not enhance his international or domestic status enough to outweigh the potential benefits. Putin would of course spin it in a way that makes him look good, but then again, he spins everything that happens in the world that way.
Top Image: In this photo made from the footage taken from Russian Defense Ministry official web site on Friday, Oct. 9, 2015, a bomb is released from Russian Su-34 strike fighter in Syria. Activists report intense fighting between insurgents and Syrian troops in the country’s center amid new territorial gains for the government, backed by Russian airstrikes. (Russian Defense Ministry Press Service via AP)
This article was originally published by the Carnegie Corporation in New York and is reprinted here with permission.