Foreign Policy published an intriguing article by Aaron David Miller, arguing that U.S.’s current Syria policy is the inevitable outcome of President Barack Obama’s foreign policy worldview. Among these beliefs, Miller cited the president’s determination to extricate the U.S. from wars; his skepticism of the ability of the U.S. to shape complex political outcomes abroad; and his refusal to take action that would jeopardize nuclear negotiations with Iran. The article highlights the oft-limited utility of calling for policies that violate the administration’s most deeply held beliefs, which arguments for bold, decisive U.S. action tend to neglect. There is always a place and need for strong voices calling for major policy shifts, of course. But if few analysts present options for more limited policies that can gain traction with policymakers, modest but important opportunities to strengthen U.S. policy in Syria will be missed.
Strong arguments abound for such action: for example, an early U.S. military intervention against the regime would have ended the war swiftly and empowered insurgent groups more palatable than most of the current players. Large-scale material support for non-jihadist groups – whatever their serious flaws – would lead to a healthier Syria than the one we see today, where the most capable militias include the Islamic State, the al-Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra, Hezbollah, and the Assad government itself. A no-fly zone over all Syria, which many interventionists continue to demand, could lead to an early defeat to government forces by less radical insurgent groups. At the very least, it would save thousands of civilian lives and curb the wholesale destruction of Syrian villages, towns and cities, while freeing insurgents to focus on fighting ISIS and other extremists.
Obviously, President Obama disagrees. Advocates of greater U.S. action in Syria understand this intellectually, of course. Some continue to call for policies that are unlikely to be adopted anyway. That is important, because it establishes a benchmark for U.S. policy and lays the groundwork for robust U.S. action when domestic and international circumstances change, as they inevitably will. However, there is also an urgent need for less bold and risky analysis and policy options. Such policies will not guarantee excellent results, nor will they solve the Syrian conflict, but they could also gain traction with the administration – or would at least be less likely to be dismissed or opposed outright.
While the Syrian conflict’s fragmented nature makes it seem unsolvable (especially to the current U.S. administration), in fact it presents local opportunities that lend themselves well to cautious, limited U.S. engagement. For example, the United States could play a more active diplomatic role in mediating between minorities and the Sunni-dominated insurgency. It could involve itself in ongoing negotiations between Iran and the insurgency (Assad’s government is playing an increasingly marginal role here). The U.S. could dramatically boost financial assistance to local governing councils in neglected areas recently liberated from ISIS. An anti-ISIS “safe zone” in northern Aleppo province could materialize. While guaranteed to fall short of demands for a safe zone over Syria, it would nonetheless come as a relief to the civilians ISIS has targeted in Marea and elsewhere. This policy in turn could allow the opposition to strengthen local governance in parts of the Aleppo province. Although U.S. officials have repeatedly rejected that the “safe zone” aims to target Assad, it would free resources for the Syrian insurgency to better focus on fighting his forces.
Many interventionists will always consider these policies less ambitious and satisfying than taking out Assad’s air force or fighting a full-scale successful proxy war against the Syrian government. But limited policy efforts that yield tangible results would certainly be less frustrating and harmful than the Syria policy status quo. They can alleviate human suffering, facilitate local governance, and defuse sectarian and ethnic tensions. This could have exponentially positive effects on the conflict as a whole – or not. Either way, until foreign or domestic political shifts allow for more decisive action, advocating for these and other focused policies is critical to both Syrian and U.S. interests. In the meantime, the best way to achieve this end involves seeking out overlaps between U.S. interests in Syria and its domestic political realities, and exploiting them relentlessly.
This article was originally published by the Atlantic Council and is reprinted here with permission.
The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Syria Deeply.
Top image: Syrian soldiers carry the coffins of their fallen comrades in Homs back in October 2011 (Associated Press/SANA)